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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
 11 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

12 JACK FLORA, ERIC MATSON,  
 13 NATHAN STONER, COURTNEY  
 OWENS, and D.J., A MINOR  
 14 CHILD, individually and on behalf of  
 similarly situated individuals,

15  
16 Plaintiffs,

17 v.

18 PRISMA LABS, INC.,

19  
20 Defendant.  
21

Civil Action No. \_\_\_\_\_

22 **COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES**  
 23 **AND EQUITABLE RELIEF**

24 **CLASS ACTION**

25 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

LOEVY & LOEVY  
 Attorneys at Law

## INTRODUCTION

1. Defendant Prisma Labs, Inc., is a company that develops mobile apps for editing and stylizing digital images and videos. The company’s “Lensa” app is specific to facial images, marketed to allow users to upload their “selfies” (or other photos of themselves) for editing and retouching. The Lensa app was first introduced in 2018, but it exploded in popularity in November of 2022 with the launch of the “magic avatar” feature, which requires a user to upload a number of selfies or facial images to function. The app then processes the images to create an artistic image, which the user can then post on social media. In the process of creating the “magic avatars,” Prisma collects the facial geometry associated with the uploaded images. It then uses that facial geometry not only to create the “magic avatar,” but also to train its neural network algorithms to, in Prisma’s words, “perform better and show [the user] better results.”

2. Plaintiffs Jack Flora, Eric Matson, Nathan Stoner, Courtney Owens, and D.J., a minor child, are individuals who have had their facial geometry collected through the Lensa app. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, upon personal knowledge of the facts pertaining to them and on information and belief based upon the investigation of counsel as to all other matters, by and through undersigned counsel, bring this class action complaint against Defendant.

## II. THE PARTIES

### **The Plaintiffs**

3. Plaintiff Jack Flora is and at all relevant times was, a resident of Illinois. Between December 2, 2022 and December 14, 2022, Flora downloaded the Lensa app, received disclosure of the then-current Lensa Privacy Policy, and agreed to the then-current Lensa Terms of Use. Plaintiff Flora brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.

1           4.     Plaintiff Eric Matson is and at all relevant times was, a resident of  
2 Illinois. Between December 2, 2022 and December 14, 2022, Matson downloaded the  
3 Lensa app, received disclosure of the then-current Lensa Privacy Policy, and agreed to  
4 the then-current Lensa Terms of Use. Plaintiff Matson brings this action on behalf of  
5 himself and all others similarly situated.

6           5.     Plaintiff Nathan Stoner is and at all relevant times was, a resident of  
7 Illinois. Between December 2, 2022 and December 14, 2022, Stoner downloaded the  
8 Lensa app, received disclosure of the then-current Lensa Privacy Policy, and agreed to  
9 the then-current Lensa Terms of Use. Plaintiff Stoner brings this action on behalf of  
10 himself and all others similarly situated.

11          6.     Plaintiff Courtney Owens is and at all relevant times was, a resident of  
12 Illinois. Between December 2, 2022 and December 14, 2022, Owens downloaded the  
13 Lensa app, received disclosure of the then-current Lensa Privacy Policy, and agreed to  
14 the then-current Lensa Terms of Use. Plaintiff Owens brings this action on behalf of  
15 herself and all others similarly situated.

16          7.     Plaintiff D.J., a minor child, is and at all relevant times was, a resident of  
17 Illinois. Between December 2, 2022 and December 14, 2022, D.J. downloaded the  
18 Lensa app, received disclosure of the then-current Lensa Privacy Policy, and agreed  
19 to the then-current Lensa Terms of Use. Plaintiff D.J. brings this action on behalf of  
20 himself and all others similarly situated.

21     **The Defendant**

22          8.     Defendant Prisma Labs, Inc., is and at all relevant times was, a Delaware  
23 corporation with its principal place of business in Sunnyvale, California.

24                     **III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

25          9.     This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28  
26 U.S.C. 1332(d) & 1367 because: (i) this is a class action in which the matter in  
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1 controversy exceeds the sum of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs; (ii) there  
2 are 100 or more class members; and (iii) some members of the class are citizens of  
3 states different from the Defendant.

4 10. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because: (i) it  
5 transacts business in this District; (ii) it has substantial aggregate contacts in this  
6 District; (iii) it engaged, and continues to engage in, conduct that has a direct,  
7 substantial, reasonably foreseeable, and intended effect of causing injury to persons in  
8 this District.

9 11. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part  
10 of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in this  
11 District. Additionally, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) because this  
12 Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

#### 13 IV. BACKGROUND

14 12. Founded in 2016, Prisma initially launched an eponymously named app,  
15 Prisma. The app was available on the Apple AppStore for iPhone users and on Google  
16 Play for Android users.


17 13. Two years later, in late 2018, Prisma launched its second product, Lensa.

18 14. While the Lensa app had been available to users for several years prior to  
19 this lawsuit, its popularity skyrocketed in late November and early December of 2022  
20 due to the launch of its “magic avatars” feature. In November, the app was  
21 downloaded 1.6 million times, up 631% from the month prior.<sup>1</sup> According to  
22 preliminary estimates, the app was downloaded by over 4 million people in the first  
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25

26 <sup>1</sup> [https://techcrunch.com/2022/12/01/lensa-ai-climbs-the-app-store-charts-as-its-magic-avatars-go-](https://techcrunch.com/2022/12/01/lensa-ai-climbs-the-app-store-charts-as-its-magic-avatars-go-viral/)  
27 [viral/](https://techcrunch.com/2022/12/01/lensa-ai-climbs-the-app-store-charts-as-its-magic-avatars-go-viral/), attached as Exhibit 1.

five days of December alone, during which time users spent over \$8 million in the app.<sup>2</sup>

15. As of December 11, 2022, Lensa was listed as the top free app on both the Apple AppStore and the Google Play Store. It was also listed as the top grossing app in the Photography category on the Play Store, and the fifth-highest grossing app in all categories (behind Google One, TikTok, Disney+ and HBO Max). Lensa's rapid rise following the release of the "magic avatars" feature is illustrated in the following graphic:



16. While the app can be downloaded and some of its features used for free, users are directed upon launch to pay a subscription fee of \$29.99 per year. A subscription entitles users to discounted purchases within the app, including discounts on the purchase of "magic avatars."

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.wired.com/story/lensa-ai-magic-avatars-security-tips/#:~:text=Andrey%20Usoltsev%2C%20the%20CEO%20and,in%20an%20email%20to%20WIRED>, attached as Exhibit 2.

17. The app’s “magic avatars” feature requires users to upload at least eight photos of themselves (i.e., “selfies”). Lensa then uses the uploaded selfies to create an art-enhanced, stylized “avatar” based on the user’s face. The “magic avatars” are produced in a variety of user-selected styles such as “cosmic,” “anime,” or “fairy princess.” Users with a subscription pay \$3.99 for 50 unique avatars (five variations of 10 different styles), \$5.99 for 100 unique avatars (10 variations of 10 styles), or \$7.99 for 200 unique avatars (20 variations of 10 styles). The prices are doubled for non-subscribed users.<sup>3</sup>

18. Although the app is promoted as a means of creating a personal “magic avatar” for the user, users are not required to upload solely their own selfies for the generation of the “magic avatar” image. A user can create an avatar for anyone by uploading a collection of the non-user’s images, and avatars of celebrities (not created by the celebrities themselves) have already circulated widely on social media. And there’s nothing to stop a user from providing images of an ex-spouse/partner, school rival, unfriendly neighbor, or family member, even for insidious purposes. This possibility is particularly worrisome given the fact that the Lensa app often generates highly sexualized images, particularly of women, as discussed in detail *infra*.

## V. USER EXPERIENCE

19. Once a user downloads the Lensa app from either the AppStore or Google Play and opens the app, they are prompted to agree to the Terms and Conditions and the Privacy Policy, each of which is hyperlinked.

20. The user then clicks through several highlighted features before the app prompts them to sign up for a 7-day free trial followed by a one-year subscription via a “Try Free & Subscribe” button. The user is able to close out of the “Try Free &

<sup>3</sup> <https://techcrunch.com/2022/12/10/this-week-in-apps-apple-app-stores-new-pricing-twitter-app-makers-shift-to-mastodon-debate-over-lensa-ai/>, attached as Exhibit 3.

1 Subscribe” option, but Prisma’s use of dark patterns promotes users to choose the  
2 subscription option.

3 21. Once the user makes that selection, they have access to the app and its  
4 features. Regardless of whether the user purchases the subscription or proceeds to the  
5 free app, the next page takes the user to the “magic avatar” feature and invites them to  
6 “Try now.”

7 22. Thereafter, every time the app is opened the user is given two options:  
8 “Add photos” or “Magic Avatars.” Regardless of which option is chosen, the user  
9 cannot proceed without first giving Lensa access to all photos stored on their device.

10 23. After selecting the “magic avatars” feature, the user is prompted to  
11 confirm their age before using the feature.

12 24. To use the magic avatars feature, the user must upload anywhere from  
13 eight to twenty photos and the user then waits for a period of time before Lensa  
14 produces the requested digital avatar portraits.

## 15 VI. CONCERNS ABOUT LENSA

16 25. Immediately after the launch of the “magic avatars” feature, users, artists,  
17 and others began raising significant concerns about the Lensa-created “magic  
18 avatars.” To create the avatars, the app uses Stable Diffusion, an open-source AI  
19 model which was originally trained on 2.3 billion captioned images from the internet,  
20 including images from sites like Pinterest, Smugmug, Flickr, DeviantArt, ArtStation,  
21 Getty and Shutterstock. Many of those images are copyrighted, and artists have  
22 complained that apps using Stable Diffusion to create unique images – such as Lensa  
23 – violate the copyrights to art they have posted online. One Twitter user identified  
24 more than two dozen Lensa-created “magic avatars” – just from her own timeline,  
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1 within a week after the feature was launched – showing the “mangled remains” of the  
2 original artist’s signature.<sup>4</sup>

3 26. In addition, users discovered that despite Lensa’s Terms of Use  
4 mandating a “no nudes” policy, the app would generate sexualized images from  
5 images containing nothing but fully-clothed images. Multiple news outlets ran  
6 experiments to test this theory, and discovered “it’s possible – and way too easy – to  
7 use the platform to generate non-consensual soft porn.”<sup>5</sup> One reporter noted not only  
8 that the app generated nude images, but did so even when the photos uploaded were  
9 images from her childhood – results which she described as “horrifying.”<sup>6</sup> The same  
10 reporter also recounted users receiving avatars which ascribed “cartoonishly  
11 sexualized features, like sultry poses and gigantic breasts, to their images,” and  
12 anglicized facial features and skin tone for images of people of color.<sup>7</sup>

13 27. Another apparent concern has received far less attention: Lensa’s  
14 invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals whose images are uploaded.  
15 Specifically, as discussed in detail below, Prisma uses Lensa to capture the facial  
16 geometry of the subjects of the images, and uses that information to train its neural  
17 network(s) and thereby improve the app. All of which, of course, leads to greater  
18 revenue and profits for Prisma. And all of which, as detailed below, is done in  
19 knowing violation of the law.

## 20 VI. BIOMETRICS

21 28. In 2008, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act  
22 (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1, *et seq.* This was due to the “very serious need [for]

23 <sup>4</sup>

24 <https://twitter.com/LaurynIpsium/status/1599953586699767808?s=20&t=3VynzarfXwitf1JYfL8Eqg>

25 <sup>5</sup> <https://techcrunch.com/2022/12/06/lensa-goes-nsfw/>, attached as Exhibit 4; see also

26 <https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/12/12/1064751/the-viral-ai-avatar-app-lensa-undressed-me-without-my-consent/>, attached as Exhibit 5.

27 <sup>6</sup> <https://www.wired.com/story/lensa-artificial-intelligence-csem/>, attached as Exhibit 6.

28 <sup>7</sup> *Id.*



1 protections for the citizens of Illinois when it [comes to their] biometric information.”  
 2 Illinois House Transcript, 2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276. The Illinois Legislature  
 3 recognized the importance of protecting the privacy of individuals’ biometric data,  
 4 finding that “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to access  
 5 finances or other sensitive information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(c). “For example, social  
 6 security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are  
 7 biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has  
 8 no recourse [and] is at heightened risk for identity theft ....” *Id.*

9       29. BIPA thus focuses on “biometric identifiers” and “biometric  
 10 information.” Biometric identifiers consist of “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint,  
 11 voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.” 740 ILCS 14/10. A “scan” under BIPA  
 12 means to examine by observation or checking, or systematically in order to obtain data  
 13 especially for display or storage. “Geometry” under BIPA is the relative arrangement  
 14 of parts or elements. Neither the term “scan” nor the term “geometry” requires actual  
 15 or express measurements of spatial quantities like distance, depth, or angles.  
 16 Biometric information constitutes “any information, regardless of how it is captured,  
 17 converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to  
 18 identify an individual.” 740 ILCS 14/10.

19       30. Defendant collects, possesses, stores, uses, and profits from the  
 20 Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers—namely, scans of their face geometry. These  
 21 identifiers are then tagged to their access devices and used as biometric information.

## 22                   **VI. PRISMA’S COLLECTION AND CAPTURE OF BIOMETRIC** 23                   **INFORMATION THROUGH THE LENSEA APP**

24       31. As detailed in the following paragraphs, Prisma (1) collects the photo  
 25 subject’s biometric data (facial geometry) in a non-anonymized fashion; (2) offers a  
 26 confusing and false disclosure of its collection practices; (3) retains the subject’s  
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 28

1 biometric data in a non-anonymized fashion, (4) retains that data indefinitely for uses  
2 wholly unrelated to the user’s purpose for using Lensa, (5) profits from the  
3 biometrics; and (6) has no public written policy for the deletion of that data.

4 32. Prisma purports to disclose its collection and capture of user information  
5 through Lensa in its Privacy Policy.

6 33. The Lensa Privacy Policy has been frequently updated in months prior to  
7 the filing of this Complaint; first on June 6, 2022, again on November 14, 2022 (just  
8 prior to the “magic avatars” launch), again on December 2, 2022 (just after the launch  
9 when it was apparent Lensa was being downloaded by millions of users), and yet  
10 again on December 15, 2022.

11 34. Each iteration of the Privacy Policy on Lensa’s website purports to link  
12 to the previously effective Privacy Policy. Curiously, however, the link on the current  
13 Privacy Policy redirects to the November 14, 2022 Privacy Policy, rather than the  
14 December 2, 2022 Privacy Policy that was disclosed to each of the named Plaintiffs.

15 35. Each of the named Plaintiffs herein downloaded Lensa and uploaded  
16 photos to create magic avatars when the December 2, 2022 Privacy Policy was in  
17 effect, and thus received the disclosures set forth therein when they acknowledged  
18 acceptance of the Privacy Policy. Accordingly, the Privacy Policy discussed herein is  
19 the December 2, 2022 Privacy Policy (the “Privacy Policy”) unless otherwise noted.<sup>8</sup>

20 36. In its own words, the Privacy Policy purports to describe: “The types of  
21 information we may collect or that all users or others (‘Users’, ‘you’ or ‘your’, as  
22 applicable) may provide while downloading, installing, registering with, accessing, or  
23 otherwise using” Lensa, as well as Prisma’s “practices for collecting, using,  
24

25 <sup>8</sup> A true and correct copy of the December 2, 2022 Privacy Policy is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.  
26 True and correct copies of the December 15, 2022 Privacy Policy and the November 14, 2022  
27 Privacy Policy – i.e., each of the policies in effect during the lifetime of the magic avatar feature –  
28 are attached hereto as Exhibits 8 and 9, respectively.

maintaining protecting, and disclosing that information.” To emphasize the point, the Privacy Policy further provides, “**Please read this Privacy Policy carefully to understand our policies and practices regarding your information and how we will treat it. The purpose of our Privacy Policy is to explain what data we collect, how it is used and shared, and how you can control it. If you do not want us to process your Personal Data as it is described in this Privacy Policy, please do not Use Lensa.**” (emphasis in original).

37. Despite this stated purpose, the Privacy Policy fails to disclose the biometric data and other information Prisma collects from its users and from the images uploaded through Lensa.

38. For example, Section 2, “Information You Provide To Us Directly,” purports to disclose the information Prisma collects directly from its users. The section provides the following list: (1) photos and videos; (2) the user’s gender; (3) information provided by interacting with the app (such as filling in forms, requesting services, reports of technical issues, and the like); (4) details of in-app subscriptions; and (5) correspondence from the user.

39. Notably absent from this list is any reference to the facial geometry used to create the magic avatars. Thus, in the very paragraphs that purport to identify the information collected from users, Prisma deliberately fails to disclose that it is collecting its users’ biometric data.

40. The policy later obliquely references facial geometry in Section 4, which describes “How We Process Your Photos And Videos.” The Privacy Policy states that Prisma “will process (provided by you) human face images (photo or video) through TrueDepth API technologies that will provide us information about such human faces’ position, orientation and their topology on your image and/or video frame.” However, the policy falsely indicates that facial geometry data is not collected supposedly

1 because it never leaves the user’s device, and also that the user’s biometric data is  
2 “anonymized: “What we see is only the anonymized information, as described above,  
3 about the technical characteristics of the photo (faces’ position, orientation, their  
4 topology on your image and/or video frame).”

5 41. This statement simply cannot be true; if it were, Prisma would not be  
6 able to create realistic avatars of the user’s face and then return the processed avatars  
7 to the user’s device. Stated another way, the user’s identity and facial geometry must  
8 be collected in an identifiable way in order for Prisma to deliver its product to the  
9 user. Thus, the Privacy Policy admits that Prisma uses the “technical characteristics of  
10 the photo (faces’ position, orientation, their topology on your image and/or video  
11 frame)” – i.e., a scan of the user’s facial geometry – to create the magic avatars. But at  
12 the same time, Prisma both disavows that Prisma collects and stores this data and also  
13 does not disclose that the user’s biometric identifiers and biometric information are  
14 not anonymized. Therefore, Prisma does collect biometric identifiers and biometric  
15 information when creating and supplying avatars, but it does not disclose these  
16 practices to its users.

17 42. The falsity of the purported anonymization of the subject’s biometric  
18 data is further confirmed by use of the phrase, “as described above.” The only prior  
19 reference to an anonymization process is in Section 3, which describes the  
20 anonymization process for the user’s non-biometric data, such as IP address, unique  
21 device identifier, traffic data, logs and other communication data. The Privacy Policy  
22 confirms that this anonymization process applies only to the data described in Section  
23 3, and not to the biometric data described in Section 4: “We have a process in place to  
24 anonymize data **specified in this Section 3** fully by erasing identifiers that connect  
25 you to stored data.” (emphasis added).

43. The Privacy Policy goes on to state that Prisma collects “Face Data” but defines the term to include data that the policy already said Prisma does *not* collect – i.e. biometric information extracted from photos: “Images (photo or video), that you provide us in or through Lensa, and/or other information related to human faces obtained from your images (photo or video) and/or using TrueDepth API technologies, such as ARKit, are the ‘**Face Data**’. The Face Data shall be considered the Personal Data[.]” (underline added; bolded text in original). Both TrueDepth and ARKit use facial geometry to process images of faces.<sup>9</sup> Conflating photographs and “other information related to human faces” is not a disclosure of the fact that Prisma is collecting biometric identifiers and biometric information.

44. The contradictions continue in the next paragraph, which provides:

We collect and store your Face Data for online processing function. We also share and transfer the Face Data off the User devices to our cloud providers (Google Cloud Platform and Amazon Web Services) for the same purpose in which case, the photos: (i) become available to us in an anonymized manner (we get information about your pose, orientation and the topology on your image and/or video frame) and (ii) are automatically deleted within 24 hours after being processed by Lensa. In case of using Magic Avatars feature, the photos are automatically deleted after the AI results are generated.

45. As the above excerpted language shows, Prisma fails to establish/inform the users of a retention schedule for the destruction of biometric identifiers and information, much less for permanently destroying such data within the statutorily-required time periods. Rather, Prisma’s policy only mentions destruction of

<sup>9</sup> See <https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108> (TrueDepth “captures accurate face data by projecting and analyzing thousands of invisible dots to create a depth map of your face and also captures an infrared image of your face”) (copy attached as Exhibit 10); [https://developer.apple.com/documentation/arkit/content\\_anchors/tracking\\_and\\_visualizing\\_faces](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/arkit/content_anchors/tracking_and_visualizing_faces) (“ARKit provides a coarse 3D mesh geometry matching the size, shape, topology, and current facial expression of the user’s face”) (copy attached as Exhibit 11).

1 photographs, not of the biometric data associated with the user and biometric data  
2 obtained from the photographs.

3 46. The policy also fails to disclose the ways in which Prisma profits from  
4 the biometric data. Section 5 states that the company uses the photos it collects to train  
5 its AI without disclosing that it is in fact extracting the users' biometric identifiers  
6 from the photos to do so. "To train our neural network algorithms. We use your  
7 photos and videos to train our algorithms to perform better and show you better  
8 results. We have a legitimate interest to do so, and we do our best to minimise [sic]  
9 the data that we receive and not to override the rights and freedoms of the users in this  
10 regard."

11 47. Notably, this bullet point was not included in the Privacy Policy prior to  
12 the December 2, 2022 update, and it is not included in the December 15, 2022 Privacy  
13 Policy. It is telling that the clearest statement made by Prisma that it is collecting  
14 users' biometric identifiers and biometric information and retaining such data for an  
15 indeterminate period of time – accompanied only by a vague assurance that "we do  
16 our best" to protect such data – was quickly excised from the Privacy Policy. Even  
17 worse, by failing to include the December 2, 2022 Privacy Policy in the iterative "see  
18 our previous Privacy Policy" links on its website, Prisma is not only currently failing  
19 to disclose these practices, but is intentionally keeping users from finding out.

20 48. Thus, in the course of making a great deal of money from providing its  
21 users with "magic avatars" that raise concerns ranging from copyright violations to  
22 the potential creation of child sexual exploitation material, Prisma is also acquiring  
23 vast amounts of individual's biometric data without disclosing that fact, nor its  
24 purposes for the data, nor how it stores the data, nor how long it retains data, nor of  
25 the uses it makes of the data, nor its profiting from the data. Moreover, Prisma is  
26 profiting from the data and is failing to obtain "a written release executed by the  
27  
28

1 subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally  
2 authorized representative.” Prisma is violating BIPA in each of these respects.

### 3 VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

4 49. Plaintiffs seek certification of the class set forth herein pursuant to  
5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek class  
6 certification of all claims for relief herein on behalf of a class defined as follows: All  
7 persons who reside in Illinois whose biometric data was collected, captured,  
8 purchased, received through trade, or otherwise obtained by Prisma, either through  
9 use of the Lensa app or otherwise. Plaintiffs are the proposed class representatives for  
10 the Class.

11 50. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or refine the definition of the Class,  
12 including right to identify and define Subclasses as necessary.

13 51. Excluded from the Class are: **(i)** any judge or magistrate judge presiding  
14 over this action and members of their staff, as well as members of their families; **(ii)**  
15 Defendant, Defendant’s predecessors, parents, successors, heirs, assigns, subsidiaries,  
16 and any entity in which any Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest, as  
17 well as Defendant’s current or former employees, agents, officers, and directors; **(iii)**  
18 persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class;  
19 **(iv)** persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or  
20 otherwise released; **(v)** counsel for Defendant; and **(vi)** the legal representatives,  
21 successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons.

22 52. **Ascertainability:** The proposed Class is readily ascertainable because it  
23 is defined using objective criteria so as to allow Class members to determine if they  
24 are part of the Class. Further, the Class can be readily identified through records  
25 maintained by Defendant.



1           **53. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)):** The Class is so numerous that joinder of  
2 individual members herein is impracticable. The exact number of Class members as  
3 herein identified and described, is not known, but download figures indicate that at  
4 least 8.2 million people have downloaded Lensa since the release of the “magic  
5 avatars” feature.

6           **54. Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2)):** Common questions of fact and law exist  
7 for each cause of action and predominate over questions affecting only individual  
8 Class members including the following:

- 9           a. Whether Defendant’s activities and practices referenced above constitute  
10 a violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS  
11 14/1, et seq;
- 12           b. Whether Defendant’s activities and practices referenced above constitute  
13 unjust enrichment concerning which restitution and/or disgorgement is  
14 warranted;
- 15           c. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the Class sustained damages as a  
16 result of Defendant’s activities and practices referenced above, and if so,  
17 in what amount.
- 18           d. What constitutes appropriate injunctive relief to make sure Plaintiffs’  
19 biometric information is not collected without their notice or consent and  
20 that Prisma otherwise complies with BIPA.

21           **55. Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)):** Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of  
22 members of the Class, among other things, Plaintiffs and members of the Class  
23 sustained similar injuries as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and  
24 their claims all arise from the same events and wrongful conduct by Defendant.

25           **56. Adequacy (Rule 23(a)(4)):** Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect  
26 the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs’ interests do not conflict with the interests of the  
27  
28



1 Class and Class members, and Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in  
2 complex class action and privacy litigation to prosecute this case on behalf of the  
3 Class.

4       **57. Predominance & Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)):** In addition to satisfying  
5 the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for maintaining a  
6 class action under Rule 23(b)(3). Common questions of law and fact predominate over  
7 any questions affecting only individual Class members, and a class action is superior  
8 to individual litigation and all other available methods for the fair and efficient  
9 adjudication of this controversy. The amount of damages available to Plaintiffs is  
10 insufficient to make litigation addressing Defendant's conduct economically feasible  
11 in the absence of the class action procedure. Individualized litigation also presents a  
12 potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and  
13 expense presented by the complex legal and factual issues of the case to all parties and  
14 the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management  
15 difficulties and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale, and  
16 comprehensive supervision by a single court.

17       **58. Final Declaratory or Injunctive Relief (23(b)(2)):** Plaintiffs also satisfy  
18 the requirements for maintaining a class action under Rule 23(b)(2). Defendant has  
19 acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, making final  
20 declaratory and/or injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole.

21       **59. Particular Issues (Rule 23(c)(4)):** Plaintiffs also satisfy the requirements  
22 for maintaining a class action under Rule 23(c)(4). Their claims consist of particular  
23 issues that are common to all Class members and are capable of class-wide resolution  
24 that will significantly advance the litigation.

## VII. CAUSES OF ACTION

### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(a)

60. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

61. Section 15(a) of BIPA requires that a “private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.”

62. Defendant is a “private entity” as defined in section 10 of BIPA.

63. The facial geometry collected by Defendant are “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” as defined in section 10 of BIPA.

64. Defendant is in possession of the Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ biometric identifiers and biometric information.

65. As detailed herein, Defendant has not established a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.

66. To the contrary, Defendant’s written policy for deletion of information collected from Lensa users and otherwise, fails to disclose that Prisma possesses the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ biometric identifiers or information and expressly

1 excludes reference to biometric identifiers and biometric information in discussing its  
2 retention practices. In other words, Defendant has no written policy for deletion of  
3 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' biometric identifiers and biometric information.

4 67. By failing to develop a publicly-available written policy for the deletion  
5 of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' biometric identifiers and biometric information, and  
6 by instead retaining such data indefinitely, Defendant recklessly or intentionally (or,  
7 in the alternative, negligently) violated the requirements of BIPA section 15(a),  
8 thereby infringing on Plaintiffs' and Class members' rights to keep their immutable  
9 and uniquely identifying biometric identifiers and biometric information private. As  
10 individuals subjected to this violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs and the Class members have  
11 been aggrieved.

12 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**  
13 **Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1)**

14 68. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as  
15 if fully set forth herein.

16 69. Section 15(b)(1) of BIPA provides, "No private entity may collect,  
17 capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a  
18 customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first ... informs the  
19 subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing that a biometric  
20 identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored."

21 70. As detailed herein, Defendant has collected, captured, purchased,  
22 received through trade or otherwise obtained Plaintiffs' and Class members' biometric  
23 identifiers or biometric information, without informing Plaintiffs and Class members  
24 that a biometric identifier or biometric information was being collected or stored.

25 71. Specifically, at no point does Defendant's Privacy Policy use the terms  
26 "facial geometry" or "biometric," or otherwise inform Plaintiffs that the information  
27  
28

1 collected by Defendant is a unique and immutable identifier that may be used to  
2 identify Plaintiffs for the rest of their life, and which data, if stolen, may be used to  
3 impersonate Plaintiffs and the Class members or otherwise steal their identity.

4 72. Defendant also misrepresent that the biometric data collected is  
5 anonymized, creating a false sense of security for Plaintiffs and the Class that their  
6 biometric information cannot be used in the future to identify and/or impersonate  
7 them.

8 73. Accordingly, Defendant has not informed Plaintiffs in writing that their  
9 biometric identifiers or biometric information is being collected or stored.

10 74. By failing to inform Plaintiffs and Class Members in writing that their  
11 biometric identifiers and biometric information are being collected and stored,  
12 Defendant recklessly or intentionally (or, in the alternative, negligently) violated the  
13 requirements of BIPA section 15(b)(1), thereby infringing on Plaintiffs' and Class  
14 members' rights to keep their immutable and uniquely identifying biometric  
15 identifiers and biometric information private. As individuals subjected to this  
16 violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs and the Class members have been aggrieved.

17 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**  
18 **Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(2)**

19 75. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as  
20 if fully set forth herein.

21 76. Section 15(b)(2) of BIPA provides, "No private entity may collect,  
22 capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a  
23 customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first ... informs the  
24 subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing of the specific  
25 purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is  
26 being collected, stored, and used."

1           77. As detailed herein, Defendant has collected, captured, purchased,  
2 received through trade or otherwise obtained Plaintiffs' and Class members' biometric  
3 identifiers or biometric information, without informing Plaintiffs and Class members  
4 of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric  
5 information is being collected, stored and used.

6           78. To the contrary, as detailed above, Defendant intentionally suggests that  
7 Defendant deletes Plaintiffs' and Class members' biometric data within 24 hours of  
8 creating a "magic avatar," when in fact Plaintiffs' and Class members' biometric data  
9 is retained indefinitely to train Defendant's neural network algorithm.

10           79. Accordingly, Defendant has not informed Plaintiffs and Class members  
11 in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric  
12 identifiers or biometric information is collected or stored.

13           80. By failing to inform Plaintiffs and Class Members in writing of the  
14 specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric identifiers and biometric  
15 information are being collected and stored, Defendant recklessly or intentionally (or,  
16 in the alternative, negligently) violated the requirements of BIPA section 15(b)(2),  
17 thereby infringing on Plaintiffs' and Class members' rights to keep their immutable  
18 and uniquely identifying biometric identifiers and biometric information private. As  
19 individuals subjected to this violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs and the Class members have  
20 been aggrieved.

21                                   **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
22           **Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3)**

23           81. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as  
24 if fully set forth herein.

25           82. Section 15(b)(3) of BIPA provides, "No private entity may collect,  
26 capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a  
27  
28

customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first ... receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally authorized representative."

83. As detailed herein, Defendant has collected, captured, purchased, received through trade or otherwise obtained Plaintiffs' and Class members' biometric identifiers or biometric information, without receiving a written release executed by Plaintiffs and Class members.

84. By failing to obtain a written release authorizing the collecting and storing of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' biometric information, Defendant recklessly or intentionally (or, in the alternative, negligently) violated the requirements of BIPA section 15(b)(3), thereby infringing on Plaintiffs' and Class members' rights to keep their immutable and uniquely identifying biometric identifiers and biometric information private. As individuals subjected to this violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs and the Class members have been aggrieved.

**FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(c)**

85. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

86. Section 15(c) of BIPA provides, "No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information."

87. As detailed herein, Defendant has profited and continues to profit from its collection of Plaintiffs' and Class members' biometric identifiers or biometric information, specifically by using such information to improve the Lensa app and, on information and belief, other Prisma products.

**SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(d)**

90. Section 15(d) of BIPA provides, “No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or biometric information may disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information” absent disclosure of such practice and the customer’s consent.

92. By disclosing, redisclosing and/or disseminating Plaintiffs' and Class Members' biometric identifiers and biometric information, Defendant recklessly or intentionally (or, in the alternative, negligently) violated the requirements of BIPA section 15(d), thereby infringing on Plaintiffs' and Class members' rights to keep their



1 immutable and uniquely identifying biometric identifiers and biometric information  
2 private. As individuals subjected to this violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs and the Class  
3 members have been aggrieved.

4 **SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
5 **Violation of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(e)**

6 93. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as  
7 if fully set forth herein.

8 94. Section 15(e) of BIPA provides, “A private entity in possession of a  
9 biometric identifier or biometric information shall (1) store, transmit, and protect from  
10 disclosure all biometric identifiers and biometric information using the reasonable  
11 standard of care within the private entity’s industry; and (2) store, transmit, and  
12 protect from disclosure all biometric identifiers and biometric information in a manner  
13 that is the same as or more protective than the manner in which the private entity  
14 stores, transmits, and protects other confidential and sensitive information.”

15 95. On information and belief, Defendant stores, transmits and protects  
16 Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information meets  
17 neither the reasonable industry standard of care nor the standard by which Prisma  
18 stores, transmits, and protects other confidential and sensitive information.

19 96. By failing to store, transmit and protect from disclosure Plaintiffs’ and  
20 Class Members’ biometric identifiers and biometric information according to industry  
21 standard or its own internal standards, Defendant recklessly or intentionally (or, in the  
22 alternative, negligently) violated the requirements of BIPA section 15(e), thereby  
23 infringing on Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights to keep their immutable and  
24 uniquely identifying biometric identifiers and biometric information private. As  
25 individuals subjected to this violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs and the Class members have  
26 been aggrieved.



**EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**Unjust Enrichment**

97. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

98. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant—namely, among other things, Defendant used their biometric identifiers and biometric information to increase its user base and the number of users paying for Defendant’s services.

99. Plaintiff and Class Members did not authorize or otherwise consent to Defendant unlawfully collecting, disclosing and/or using their biometric identifiers or biometric information.

100. Defendant appreciated, accepted and retained the benefit bestowed upon it under inequitable and unjust circumstances arising from Defendant’s conduct toward Plaintiff and Class Members as described herein – namely: (a) Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit on Defendant, and Defendant accepted or retained that benefit; and (b) Defendant used Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information for business purposes – namely, it collected, disclosed and used the information to increase its revenues.

101. Defendant did not provide full compensation for the benefit Plaintiff and Class Members conferred upon it.

102. Defendant acquired Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information through inequitable means in that it misrepresented the purpose for which it obtained the information and how it would use that information.

103. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

104. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair for Defendant to be permitted to retain any of the benefits that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred on it.

105. Under the principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be permitted to retain the personal information belonging to Plaintiff and Class Members because Defendant obtained that information under false pretenses.

106. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive trust, for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class Members, proceeds that it unjustly received from the sale of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information.

### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Jack Flora, Eric Matson, Nathan Stoner, Courtney Owens, and D.J., a minor child, individually and on behalf of the all Class Members, respectfully seek from the Court the following relief:

- a. Certification of the Class as requested herein;
- b. Appointment of Plaintiffs as Class representative and their undersigned counsel as Class counsel;
- c. Award Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class damages;
- d. Award Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class equitable, injunctive and declaratory relief;
- e. Award Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permitted by law;
- f. Award Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit; including expert witness fees; and

g. Award Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class any further relief the Court deems proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all claims so triable.

Dated: February 15, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Thomas M. Hanson  
*One of Plaintiffs' Attorneys*

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LOEVY & LOEVY  
Attorneys at Law

# ClassAction.org

This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: [Lensa App's 'Magic Avatar' Feature Illegally Captures User Facial Geometry, Class Action Claims](#)

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